Phil of math - interesting note

By my nature i am disposed toward a P. Maddy type explanation of basic mathematical objects. That is, that we do interact with mathematical entities, at least the most basic ones (such as natural numbers) by doing such things as counting. That is, our knowledge of the basic parts of math is empirical knowledge.

Tonight I am reading Azzouni's "Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice" and right before we are heading into a dozen pages on Quine / Quine-Putnam (to which i am also well disposed) Azzouni makes the point ...

"Consider Greek geometric practice as compared to that of their Egyptian predecessors. Egyptian geometers apparently did rely on perception to derive their conclusions. This is why they got many things wrong."

It is an off-hand comment in the closing paragraph of a section, so i suspect it could use some research and reinforcing, but it certainly seems true from what i know of the ancient mathematicians.

Thought provoking.