... but how is the truth relative?
An old notion, but one i like to speak from time to time ...
A debate is often framed between absolute truth (or "Truth" with the big "T") and relativism. The current status of the debate is moreso, though, showing others where they still have Truth in their thinking, as one meets very few non Christians or Islamists (or maybe a A. Randian) who actually believe in a human obtainable/knowable Truth. I bet there are still some good Platonists out there somewhere, by i never meet them.
But whether we are engaged in this debate, or merely pointing out to others where they are being inconsistent in this regard, one thing always seems missing to me. The relativists and Platonists both often use the phrase "truth is relative" when they mean to claim that truth is arbitrary. They are very different claims. The former claim in not incompatible with the notion that a type or types of knowledge can be better than others, and a type or types of knowledge can be worse than others. The latter claim, that truth is arbitrary, can not use, or at least i have not yet seen it used, the word "better" in any meaningful way. It renders all value statements (whether they use "should" or "ought") untenable. Even statements such as "Nationalist authoritarians should be stopped" begin to make no sense.
The phrase "truth is relative" contains a very wide set of beliefs. Really it covers the whole ground between absolute and arbitrary. One could believe that all truths are absolute, except one, and claim to be a relativist. Conversely, one could claim that all truths are arbitrary except one, and also claim to be a relativist. Yet we would not say that these two people share much of an agreement on truth.
My general claim is that nearly all metaphysical truths are arbitrary, but there are some truths, epistemological (some of them) or just plain material (others of them), that are relatively true ... or ... rather ... absolutely true relative to certain given conditions and constraints. The word "nearly" makes its way in front of metaphysics only because i believe that some of the truths of metaphysics proper (e.g. simple mathematical truths) are actually material truths. How one might draw this line, this distinction, is well beyond the scope of this current post. Neuroscience and developmental psychology will provide my lines of reasoning in most cases though. [Note - i do not believe that all mathematical truths are reducible to the material, or even to simple logic ... my claim is well outside the Logical Positivist claim. It asserts itself only under certain conditions.]
Where was i? ...
Oh, the question. I am, of course, setting up a question.
Where do you find yourself standing within the Relativist continuum?
Do not say, "truth is relative". Say rather, "this truth is relative, and it is relative to the notion(s) or belief(s) X and Y." To say "truth is relative" is merely to begin the task. What is needful still is waiting to be done.
A debate is often framed between absolute truth (or "Truth" with the big "T") and relativism. The current status of the debate is moreso, though, showing others where they still have Truth in their thinking, as one meets very few non Christians or Islamists (or maybe a A. Randian) who actually believe in a human obtainable/knowable Truth. I bet there are still some good Platonists out there somewhere, by i never meet them.
But whether we are engaged in this debate, or merely pointing out to others where they are being inconsistent in this regard, one thing always seems missing to me. The relativists and Platonists both often use the phrase "truth is relative" when they mean to claim that truth is arbitrary. They are very different claims. The former claim in not incompatible with the notion that a type or types of knowledge can be better than others, and a type or types of knowledge can be worse than others. The latter claim, that truth is arbitrary, can not use, or at least i have not yet seen it used, the word "better" in any meaningful way. It renders all value statements (whether they use "should" or "ought") untenable. Even statements such as "Nationalist authoritarians should be stopped" begin to make no sense.
The phrase "truth is relative" contains a very wide set of beliefs. Really it covers the whole ground between absolute and arbitrary. One could believe that all truths are absolute, except one, and claim to be a relativist. Conversely, one could claim that all truths are arbitrary except one, and also claim to be a relativist. Yet we would not say that these two people share much of an agreement on truth.
My general claim is that nearly all metaphysical truths are arbitrary, but there are some truths, epistemological (some of them) or just plain material (others of them), that are relatively true ... or ... rather ... absolutely true relative to certain given conditions and constraints. The word "nearly" makes its way in front of metaphysics only because i believe that some of the truths of metaphysics proper (e.g. simple mathematical truths) are actually material truths. How one might draw this line, this distinction, is well beyond the scope of this current post. Neuroscience and developmental psychology will provide my lines of reasoning in most cases though. [Note - i do not believe that all mathematical truths are reducible to the material, or even to simple logic ... my claim is well outside the Logical Positivist claim. It asserts itself only under certain conditions.]
Where was i? ...
Oh, the question. I am, of course, setting up a question.
Where do you find yourself standing within the Relativist continuum?
Do not say, "truth is relative". Say rather, "this truth is relative, and it is relative to the notion(s) or belief(s) X and Y." To say "truth is relative" is merely to begin the task. What is needful still is waiting to be done.
posted by Thomas F. Schminke at 9:53 PM
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