ad hominem (VI)

While “ad hominem (V)” was the only path by which I could get a few things spoken out the way I had hoped, it is problematic in severals ways. Many ways, I think, but relevenat here, it does not help us in the analysis of a debate between two third parties.

Mr A: Mr. X is a jerk.

Mr B: It’s not nice to call people names.

It seems as-if it would be pretty simple to analyse such a statement. On the face of it, Mr. A may be, himself, a jerk, as he is apparently the type of man that results to name-calling.

But there are facts that can easily sway this interpretation, and more importantly, beliefs about those facts, and relations to those facts. A simple example … it could be the case that Mr. X is a modern incarnation of Moloch. He may beat women and steal bread from orphans just to amuse himself. Calling him a jerk may be being nice. And, moreso, Mr. B might be in league with Mr. X. The point of his critique has nothing to do with really being nice, but only to get people like Mr. A to not criticize Mr. X, out of fear that the Mr. X gravy-train could come to a standstill.

In everyday parlance, of course, this is rarely the case. Probably Mr. X and Mr. A are simply having some disagreement, or Mr. X made some decision that affects Mr. A. Mr. B could be the voice of reason.

How do we go about determining which case is which.

To make matters more difficult, I’m not sure it matters whether or not Mr. X is, in actuallity, all that bad. So long as Mr. A believes he is Moloch re-incarnate and Mr. B agrees but is okay riding the gravy-train, the analysis still holds. So not only would we like to know the facts of the matter (who is Mr. X and what are the social relations between the three characters: Mr. A, Mr. B and Mr. X), and we would also like to know the belief states of the characters of Mr. A and Mr. B.

Within these variances we could produce scenarios of the basic statement and response that show Mr. B’s reation to be ad hominem in either the political or in the basic name-calling version of the ad hominem attack, but I can not think of an interpretation of the dialogue that would classify Mr. B’s reply as an “ad hominem fallacy” as it was described in previous posts. That is … it is not the case that Mr. B. is trying to defeat Mr. A’s claim that “Mr. X is jerk” by generaically calling into question Mr. A’s authority to speak.

But this is not the same scenario as was faced back in originating quote ont Tom Terrible’s web log. Something closer to that would look like this …

Mr. B: Mr. X has suggested that he is intervening for this reason … yadda yadda yadda

Mr. A: Mr. X is a liar, and he doesn’t really believe in that proposition as stated anyway.

Mr. B: That would be an ad hominem fallacy, and further, there is no need for name-calling attacks.

The first thing we would need to know to analyse this exchange is where Mr. B stands in relation to Mr. X. Again, does he benefit from Mr. X’s successes? Or, is he merely stating what Mr. X’s argument is for a specific intervention? The case that started this whole thing is ambiguous in this regard. We simply do not know to whom TT is replying.

When I step into the argument I am going to assume, however, a non straw-man position. Somewhere in the dialogue I was asking Natalie what she thought an intelligent and well-educated conservative might say to support the position of intervention in the TS case. It is within that framework that I would work with TT’s post.

The obvious repsonse, I think … that under ambiguous conditions, I am assuming the framework that I want and, thereby, making TT’s post an ad hominem fallacy almost by defintion. (If a reasonable and well educated human being could claim X, then any reply to the person that attacks ad hominem another lesser thinker of the same camp is going to be an ad hominem fallacy. But isn’t that more of a straw-man argument?)

I think there are close rhetorical links between the two fallacys. But I have once again gotten off-track. Sorry, this is what my first drafts look like. We are not discussing a case in which the original ad hominem fallacy claim was really questioned. I questioned it myself, but was happy with the notion that there is a direction from which it does apply, while releasing anyone else from the obligation of taking the step that direction. If not accepted, that merely moved TT’s post from ad ad hominem fallacy to a straight forward type 3 (from earlier posts) ad hominem attack. I was happy with either result.

The question at hand was rather the claim, either kind, is also an ad hominem attack. I like to think that we have shown here that it could have been. That given the right set of beliefs on my part, that I could have ben engaging in ad hominem attacks of the 2^nd (political) or 3^rd (generic personal attack) kind.

If this were true it would not be like the first dialouge above. The manner in which I might be personally invested in one side of the case would not be overt. That is, the political question at hand, I has claiming ad hominem fallacy with someone with whom I likley agree on what I thought should be the proper outcome. I just did not like his form of argument. At some level, though, the question might arise … can it be the case that one’s investment in nicities is itself an investment in the system as a whole, and the form of attack I do not like is important only because of its form and not by virtue of what it intends to argue against?

ad hominem (V)

I decided to take a different track ...

I think, generally, there are 3 reasons for disagreeing with a philosophical argument: it is logically wrong, it has the physical facts wrong, or it is immoral. There may be other reasons, perhaps the argument is un-aesthetic, i don't know, i don't claim to list an exhaustive list, but these are the feelings of disagreement i most often feel.

When I disagree with an argument what i disagree with is a specific claim. But as i have tried to show, when talking about such topics as "all ravens are black" in the previous posts, is that any claim/statement has, logically, multiple other unstated claims co-extensive with it. The same is true of the negation of such claims.
Specifically, here, i am concerned the relation of the disagreement with a claim to that of the inherent disagreement with the speaker of that claim. To say "this claim is wrong or misguided" is equally to say "this speaker, at least once, has said wrong or misguided things". The "at least once" is only a most favorable translation here, for the best of cases. Generally, the equivalent statment is "you, the speaker, (at least sometimes) say things that are wrong or immoral". No matter what is my intention by disagreeing ... maybe i wish to make someone's argument better, or just to show them what "is really on the end of their fork", whatever ... it remains the case that all disagreement impugns the speaker, the only question is to the degree it so does.

This is true for all correction statements, it is not just for philosophy. In the case of the most simple corrections ("you mean next Friday, yes, not this Friday?") the matter is generally quickly cleared up. There are no bad feelings. (Though there are cases, there are people, who seem to need to correct others with an intro such as "you're so stupid" or, 3rd person "look what the liar had to say today" ... the latter quite common in the political realm.)
Philosophy is more difficult a case. When i make a philosophical statement, that statement very likley has my personal investment within it. When replying to the philosophical statements of others we generally remain aware of this touchiness ... it is akin to telling a person that their hero or loved one is not the person they think that they are. But even this last sort of (sometimes necessary) cruel ... it is not a topic among stangers and mere acquaintences. The critique of heros and loved ones is left to other loved ones.
Philosophy is the worst of both worlds in this respect. Many of us feel a duty to try to impart our knowledge or wisdom to those others that we see genuinely striving to know more than what they already believe to be true. The "genuinely striving" phrase is key here, we don't take up discussions with generic loudmouths, or those like Born-Again Christians whose only real goal is to make converts. When we feel the duty, it is the duty to help those trying to move on. It is the teacher's instinct, but also, hopefully, the student instinct ... as the hope is to gain a bi-directional flow of discourse that helps ourselves as well as the other.
(When one reads what i post on other blogs, i hope it stands out, the method of intermixing question with argument. The questions are not traps, they are the hope to understand another view. They are the attempt to learn more, to make the impartation of wisdom a two way street.)

The feel of being on the defensive in a philosophical debate is going to be the feel of being attacked ad hominem. But this is often due to the nature of the philosophy more than an it is to what has been said in an individual case. It is the nature of philosophy that one is deeply invested in one's philosophical claims. Often, that is what is "doing the work" when one feels attacked. The question to my mind is, "is there a principled means by which one can determine when one is really subject to some form of an ad hominem argument, and/or when one is merely feeling the bite of the nature of philosophical discussion?" I think there is such a principled means.
The way out, i think, is to stop and ask, when one feels the pang of an attack, what is the purpose of the statement that affects one so. I say "pang" because i, at least, can physically feel it when it happens. I feel the capillaries dialating. I feel myself lose focus on the argument presented and feel the strongest urge to reply to the offending statement, isolated from the argument, immediately.

Wittgenstein, in a letter to Norman Malcolm, was speaking about the need for philosophy to make one more conscientious. What he said in that regard i think applies here too. " ... thinking about these things is not thrilling, but often downright nasty. And when it's nasty then it's most important."

To recognize that one feels attacked, and that one feels the attack to be ad hominem ... yet to work to interpret the statement or phrase that caused the feeling, to interpret the phrase as not merely ad hominem (i say "merely" in the spirit of Kant, as in the implication of his phrase "not to use the other merely as a means and not at all as an end" [that is quoted from memory, so probbaly not quite correctly]) ... if one can parse that feeling away from the role of the statement within the argument presented as a whole ...

[sleep overcomes me at this juncture]

ad hominem (IV)

The next step is tricky. This is a line of argument i have tried in several settings, analytic to continental to layman, but never with success. It is the claim that there are true but trivial truths. It may just be, as George E Smith might say, an artifact of my approach to philosophy, especially to philosophy of science. In that field, from my stance, the truths of the Scholastic scientists are of this kind. They are logically sound. They merely are not "the kind of truth worth wanting" to borrow a Dan Dennett phrase.
Why does opium make men sleepy? It has dormitive virtues.
When we cash-out what the Scholastics mean by by virtues, roughly "Aristoteleon essential properties", the claim is little more than the claim that opium produces sleepiness because it has properties that produce sleepiness.

I have have stated it there it sounds merely viciously circular. The Scholastic claim is not quite just that, but the form is related. Circular truths are themselves an example of the class of trivially true, but they are generally easy to root out. The truths of the Scholastics takes a little more work.

[called into work ... more later]

ad hominem (III)

I would like to take up my essay at the point of the concept of "what is doing the work". It is a fairly common logical fallacy to mis-identify what is the fulcrum on which an argument or idea really turns. This is especially a problem in dealing with evidence in endevours such as Philosophy of Science. You can put all the facts in logical notation to avoid confusion and still not help yourself.

I am going to work with Nelson Goodman's intuition pump statement "all crows are black", as i plan to use that later in the argument anyway.

The statement i am going to use right now is "all crows viewed in pitch dark appear black". Translated into logical notation this would read ...
A(x) (Cx & Dx) => Bx ... {For all objects 'x', if x is a crow and x is seen in dark places then x will appear black}.
[Actually that would say they "are" black rather than "appear", but i'm concerned with the front end and am hoping to avoid a confusing looking notation].
What is important here is the conjunction of Cx and Dx in front of the conditional statement. The Cx has tied itself into the logical notation as part of a conjunction ... making it necessary for the truth value of the statement to come out true.
But we know, physically, that this is a misnomer. ANY object viewed in pitch dark will appear black, whether it be a black raven, a red ball or a yellow banana.

That is where we would chime in with "what is doing the work here". The statement is not about ravens at all. What is doing the work here is the fact that the object is being viewed in the dark. The mention of raven at all is a red herring (i think that is the proper use of that term).

In the real world of debate, about things in the real world, i have found this notion to be greatly undervalued.

It will tie into my argument in two places. The first is in the notion of ad hominem argumentation itself. What is doing the work in an ad hominem attack or fallacy is the rhetoric, not the argument (see last post for more on the ad hominem argumentation form). The second place this notion will appear will be buttressing the distinction between direct and indirect violation of the ad hominem form ... that is ... the claim will be that a certain view of debate may render ALL debate to be of an ad hominem nature, and therefore some claims that one is indirectly doing the same thing the target of the debate was indirectly doing will be claimed to be true, but only trivially so. That is, that what is doing the work to support the truth of the claim is really something much lower level and benign than it might appear at first glance.
But more on that when I start actually parsing out cases of the political form of ad hominem arguments. You'll know that part when you see it because i'll start talking about beliefs and intents in relation to my examples.


For now, though, i want to head back to Goodman's "all ravens are black" statement. Goodman is discussing problems of induction (a new Hume). He notes something intersting about collecting proof for the claim "all ravens are black" (caveated as you need to know we are discussing natural non-albinos, etc). Thinking of the world as a large Vin diagram we put a big circle around all the black crows. Everything that is a crow and is black is inside the circle, everthing that is not black and a crow is outside the circle. Note, however, that there is only one circle. The statements "all crows are black" and "all non-black things are not crows" are both identically identified in the big Vin diagram. They are logically the exact same statement.
Now, i'm still thinking this part through ... and i haven't decided yet how strong of a claim i want to make using this idea. But here is the idea, out there to dwell on now. That idea being, roughly ... for every statment that makes a claim there is a logically equal negation claim made at the same time. I'm still working on that wording too.
How it will play into the overall arguement is also still a bit hazy. But i have this much written now, so i can concentrate on that next step. It will somehow tie into my argument about direct versus indirect claim. The negation claims, that "all non-black things are not ravens", i'll claim is an indirect claim of the direct claim "all ravens are black".

"How am I supposed to know what I think until I have said it?" - the Duchess in Carroll's "Alice in Wonderland". (don't quote me on that, it's from memory)

ad hominem (II)

(This is not really a piece in my argument, but i fear creeping confusion in relation to the topic. So i thought i best say something about it.)

Ad hominem ... three kinds:

I should clean-up some verbiage on the phrase "ad hominem". What we might call the generic ad hominem move has a two or three major forms: the fallacy, the political element and the straight attack or generic form. I am concerned here with the first two, the last pretty much includes just "everything else".

The ad hominem fallacy proper is a specific rhetorical device. It has the purpose of engageing and defeating an argument rhetorically, rather than analytically.

The ad hominem i'm calling political is also a rhetorical device. But this device refuses to engage and defeat an argument and instead it creates counter-accusations. It more or less "changes the subject" rather than answer the question.

The generic ad hominem is pretty much any personal attack during a dialogue. The goal is most often humor, but it can just be a lashing out reaction.

Examples:
Classic Fallacy -
Mr X: Mr. Z. had an interesting take on that topic. He said ... [whatever]
Mr Y: Mr. Z. is nothing but an actor. What does he know?
Mr Y has chosen to take on the credentials rather than the argument.

Political Power -
Mr X: I just don't believe we can afford another 8 billion dollars for Iraq.
Mr Y: What, you don't support the troops?!?
Mr Y has chosen to play the guilt card. If you prefer ...
Mr X: I just don't believe we can afford another 8 billion dollars for education.
Mr Y: What, you believe only the wealthy deserve a good education?
The idea is the same, invoke shame.

The generic case is the landscape of the Ann Coulters and Al Frankens of the world. They are really speaking to the choir and making personal attacks while doing so. But any personal attack designed to make oneself feel better by tearing down, or whatnot, would qualify.


My claim about the Tom Terrible piece linked to by Molecular Revolution (see ad hominem, i - below) is that he is engaged in either the first or the third form of the ad hominem ... depending on where you believe he stands on the Terry Shiavo case. I typed "ad hominem fallacy" because i took from context that he believes the case has already had due process. Within that context, he takes a quote from the President, who believes otherwise, and then attacks the President's consistancy rather than the due-process argument put forth by the quote.
A few posts later, on re-reading, i could definately see where one might believe that TT was not arguing about the due process part of the case at all but was just using the quote and the inconsistency of the President on right-to-life issues to attack the President in general. (Specifically, not to win an argument on due-process or to get him to shut up.) And, as it is TT's web log, very likely he is talking to the choir.
However one might take is quote and reply, thoogh, the fact that he prefices the quote with ... how did it go ... 'out ever lying Commander and Chief chimed in with this ...'. That definately qualifies as a generic class ad hominem assault.

I take it that when Vernaye is taking me to task for an ad hominem violation he is speaking about the second, political, form. I can only think that he means that my "ad hominem fallacy" notation was intended to make Natalie feel bad about liking the TT post and linking it to her page. I don't want to get into guessing at his intentionality, though, so i'll let him confirm or deny that if he cares to, or just let it stand as is if it has already been beaten too badly.


Anyway ... i hope that cleans up the ad hominem talk for those who do not feel at home in the subject matter.

ad hominem (I)

The contents of this post refer to a discussion in which i was involved at this blog site ... http://molecularphilosopher.blogspot.com under a March 22nd posting called "Brain Dead". Deciding that the next move i need to make in this game is long and boring i decided to right it over here at my site.

The specific question at hand is: Is claiming that someone has committed an ad hominem fallacy itself an ad hominem attack/argument.

The answer i will defend will say two things. First, it will say that yes, in some sense this is the case, but not in what we commonly term a "vicious" sense. Second, in terms of the vicious sense, i will conclude that it certainly can be the case that pointing out an ad hominem fallacy is nothing but an attack (or attack-like) argument, but that this is rarely actually the case. I hope to demonstrate some conditions under which it is and is not the case to make the distinction clear.

First ... my use of the word vicious (above and below) is used in the sense that someone might use it when he has been told his argument is circular. He can agree but say it is not thereby invalid because it is not viciously circular. What he means in this defense is roughly what i mean by my use of the word "vicious". This is a topic I may touch upon again later.

One last note ... the persons in the discussion at Molecular Revolution are literature and continental philosophy types. There are places where I may state that they do this or that wrong in their argumentive form, so i thought i would note that it is not oversight on their part but an intentional philosophical stance. That is, they would say i am wrong for making the distinction rather than correct against the error. Or, more broadly, you'll see that i and they often "talk past one another" because our base assumptions and programs are very significantly different.

Okay, preliminaries aside ....
The first topic i want to take up in relation to the whole case is the topic of rhetoric and the conflation of primary and secondary meanings of words.

I was once listening to a debate between a friend of mine and an acquaintance. The latter happened to be a Born-Again (or Augustinian) Christian. The debate moved into the realm of organ transplantation to save lives. My friend could not see how the Christian could be against an organ transplant procedure. The Christian’s response was that it was cannibalism.

Now, that is certainly true. The primary definition of cannibalism is (roughly) “taking a part from one thing and placing it in another”. It was, of course, the other definition that was “doing the work” in the Christian’s argument. We can approve of both these statements, that organ transplants are cannibalism and the cannibalism is wrong and still we need not conclude that organ transplants are wrong.

So … this is just a straw-man case, but it points out the kind of issue for which we will be looking.

Another example in less of a straw-man case would deal with minorities and the often-heard counter-claim that the minorities are being racist themselves when they do X, Y, or Z. Once again, the problem is that the one word, racism, is picking out two separate domains (that is, we are using more than one definition). There is a sense in which any decision made based on race is racism. But the racism that “needs to be combated” is a stranger claim than this. It needs to be combated due to the types of hatred and the possible results than occur, and these other pieces of the definition are not separatable from the stricter definition of racism. It is in reference to this more strict definition that it is claimed that minority populations cannot be racist (because the lack the proper form of power). [I don’t expect everyone reading this to accept that argument. But please note the form of the statement; it is a fairly common formal distinction. formal distinction.]

So … similar to the cannibalism case I can setup a syllogism in which choosing a suit and tie colors for someone based on the color of their skin is racism, and racism is morally wrong … therefore. I can accept both premises without accepting the conclusion because we have conflated meanings of the one word “definition” in making the case.

The main point to all this is … the path I plan to take to defend the first part of my answer … that noting an ad hominem fallacy is not, itself, a vicious breach of the “no ad hominem attacks” policy. That is, there is a sense in which it (noting an ad hominem fallacy) is itself an ad hominem, but not in the same sense in which we are concerned by the use of ad hominem attacks in standard logical debate.

[more coming]

Notes from the brain ...

1) The Question: what are the developmental steps and pathways through which such distinctly human capacities as symbol formation, language, and reflective thinking emerge in the life of each newborn.

2a) To create a meaningful symbol, the image must be invested with emotion
2b) A symbol emerges when a perception is seperated from its action

3) A second question: How do we seperate a perception from the initial tendency or urge to take immediate action?

4) An idea is an image that has been freed from a fixed, immediate action and is invested with affects or emotions (ie. intent) to give it meaning.

5) Every experience that a child undergoes involves this form of dual coding; that is, experiences are coded by their physical properties and the emotional reactions to them. (A blanket may feel smooth [and pleasant] or itchy [and irritating] ... and it is the latter emotional element that helps, indeed, may be the most imporatant factor, in producing meaningful symbols for the infant.

6) The first instances of cause and effect learned by the infant are emotional ... I smile, she smiles back, I cry, she comes over to me concerned.

- Greenspan and Shanker

A note from the Diamond Sutra

One paragraph stood out to me as i read the Diamond Sutra.

The Buddha had finished several pages discussing the rejection of phenomena as anything but illusions ... that such phrases as "the 32 marks of physical excellence" are arbitrary and should be rejected as helpful on the path to enligtenment ... and the phenomenon of physical appearance is itself arbitrary and meaningless.

He then goes on to say ...

" ... do not think the opposite either that when the Tathagata attained Highest Perfect Wisdom it was not by means of his possession of the 32 marks of physical evidence. Do not think that. Should you think that, then when you begin the practice of seeking to obtain Highest Perfect Wisdom you would think that all systems of phenomena and all conceptions about phenomena are to be cut-off and rejected. Do not think that. And why? Because when a disciple practices seeking to attain HPW, he should neither grasp after such arbitrary conceptions of phenomena nor reject them."

I love that last sentance. I think it really clarifies what the "rejection of phenomena" in the Buddhist mindset is like. It is different than just re-acting, just saying "no".


Note - The Diamond Sutra is definitely about the need to reject (arbitrary) phenomena (I take the "arbitrary" to be redundant to Siddartha, really). I pulled one paragraph from the end and talked about it only, and it needs to be kept in perspective.

return

I have returned from my business trip ...

no rest

-------------------------------------------------------------

A statement ...
One should work very hard to not confuse a tautology with a theory. I include extended tautologies (eg. visciously circular theories) in this critique.
Once you believe you have found some fact ask yourself this question, "what fact or facts would I need to discover in order to decide that I am, after all, wrong on this point?" If you cannot answer this question then you have no theory. All you have is a tautology.
Tautologies are never wrong, i'll grant you that. But neither are they ever meaningful. They apply to nothing but themselves.

The paradigmatic example of what i am attacking is solipsism. Take yourself back to a time in your life, probably when young, when you were easily able to slide into this theory and feel at home.
Question #1: What factual evidence could affect you solipsistic theory? Any?
Now, come back forward into the future.
Question #2: Why then, in your life, did you leave this theory behind? (The old joke goes, "How do you convince a young solipsist he/she is wrong? Leave them alone for 2 years and then come back and ask them how they feel about the issue. If they haven't gotten bored and moved on on their own, its not worth the time discussing it with them anyway.)

"Falisificationism", while too simplistic to be a full physical theory, is certainly on to something. Especially, it notes the primary problem with Scholastic science. The Scholastics were not wrong, they were just promoting useless theories. Sure, opium produces sleepiness because it is made up of sleep inducing elements ... this statement is true, but also useless.
Most projects of philosophical metaphysics (analytic or continental) strive to show just this ... that they are not even logically falsifiable, more or less physically (that is, that some physical fact could disprove them). So ... what does one do with such a theory even once it is completed and sound? Has not the act of such a creative process itself removed the idea from the world, from use?

Reflect on your most deeply felt metaphysical structures, your best "theory of everything". Is there any fact of notion you might discover that would prove it false? Or ... is it merely a statement, unrefutable (again, merely) by the form in which you stated it? What is doing the work? The facts? ... or the logical formation in which you have placed the facts?

The big Rorschach test ...

A worldview says far more about its possessor
than it does about the world.